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The "Operational Code" of Senator Fulbright and International Education: Belief Systems, National Missions, Political Contexts

Abstract: The article makes explicit the foreign affairs belief system of Senator Fulbright, establishes the role of international education in his belief system, and analyzes the genesis and development of the Fulbright Exchange Program in the constraining context of American governmental and political culture. The theoretical framework is the "operational code" construct developed by political scientist Alexander George who suggested that decision makers operate on the basis of distinctive belief systems that bear directly on their assessments and behaviors. Throughout his career Fulbright stuck to his basic beliefs that conflict in international politics was only temporary, that there was a latent harmony of interests, that the dominating sources of conflict were either the anarchical international system (1943–1946), or warlike states (1946–1965), or that conflict lay in man's nature (1965 on). In all three periods he staunchly maintained that international education was a potent means for slowly transforming the nature of the political universe. Fulbright's "operational code" stands undoubtedly in sharp contrast to traditional realist decision makers.

Senator Fulbright's „operational code" und internationaler Austausch. Politische Weltanschauung, nationale Mission, politischer Kontext

Zusammenfasung: Der Aufsatz expliziert Fulbrights außenpolitische Weltanschauung sowie die Rolle des internationalen Austausches in seiner Weltanschauung und analysiert die Genesis und Entwicklung des Fulbright-Austauschprogramms im restriktiven Kontext der amerikanischen politischen Kultur. Das vom Politikwissenschafter Alexander George entwickelte theoretische Konzept des „operational code" (Handlungs-kodex) liegt dabei dem folgenden Artikel zugrunde. George ging davon aus, dass Entscheidungsträger und -trägerinnen aufgrund eines Systems von politischen Überzeugungen handeln, das ihre Definition der Situation und ihr Handeln direkt beeinflusst. Während seiner öffentlichen Karriere hielt sich Fulbright an seine grundlegenden Überzeugungen: zum einem dass internationale Konflikte nur temporär seien und eine latente Harmonie der Interessen existiere, zum anderen dass entweder das anarchistische internationale System (1943–1946) oder aggressive Staaten (1946–1965) den Hauptgrund für internationale Konflikte darstellen würden oder dass Konflikte in der menschlichen Natur selbst angelegt seien (1965–). Die ganze Zeit hindurch bewahrte er sich die Überzeugung, dass der internationale Austausch ein potentes Mittel sei, die Natur des internationalen Systems zu verändern. Fulbrights Entscheidungsprämissen stehen unzweifelhaft in starkem Kontrast zum traditionellen politischen Realismus.

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Introduction[1]

The article will, first, make explicit the foreign affairs belief system of Senator Fulbright, second, establish the role of international education in his belief system, and, third, analyze the genesis and development of the Fulbright exchange program in the constraining context of U.S. government and political culture. The study of the Fulbright Exchange Program is important for demonstrating that even in a world of power politics, there are rare opportunities to fulfill the biblical injunction to beat swords into plowshares. The program also exemplifies the optimistic American commitment to the idea of an interdependent, culturally connected world, a kind of global faith that education is a cross-national force dedicated to a world that is not divided into sovereign national units. Finally, it is one of the government programs without any negative effects, perhaps a version of the Hippocratic Oath: first, do no harm. There were two great cleavages in Fulbright's operational code[2] – 1946 and 1965 – associated with changes in his images of the nature of politics, the structure of the international system, and the national role of the United States. In Fulbright's early period as a lawmaker (1943–1946), he believed in the possibility of restructuring the international system to reflect a latent harmony of interests. The basic source of conflict was the anarchical international system. Peace would result through the gradual transfer of sovereignty to the United Nations. He assigned the United States the role of reformist leader in transforming the system.

During the period from 1946 to 1965, Fulbright strongly believed that only in a world of peaceful states will there be peace. He considered the basic source of conflict warlike states. The conditions of peace could be achieved by containment, reform or elimination of warlike actors. He assigned the United States the role of free world leader in maintaining a balance of power.

After 1965, Fulbright still believed that there was a latent harmony of interests. The basic source of conflict lay in man's nature. The condition of peace could be gained through expansion of knowledge and education. The United States was to assume a low-posture leadership role in civilizing the nation-state system through functionalism and education. In all three periods, he stuck to his beliefs that conflict was temporary and that international education was a potent means for slowly transforming the nature of the political universe.

Theoretical Framework

How can we explain Fulbright's pilgrimage from UN enthusiast to cold warrior to dissenter? And how is it that he found international education so attractive a solution to the world's problems?

A theoretical framework for analyzing Fulbright's belief system is the "operational code" approach developed by US political scientist Alexander George. The code explains the characteristics of political leaders' foreign policy decision-making by reference to their political beliefs. These beliefs are classified as either philosophical or instrumental and are related to one another in a hierarchical manner. Taken together, these beliefs function as a diagnostic and prescriptive framework in which decisions are made. They tend to be both more durable and more comprehensive than particular issues. The operational code enables the individual actor to address questions regarding the essential nature of the political universe, the basic sources of conflict, the conditions of peace, and the nature and scope of conflict (George 1969, 201–216).[3]

It is important to remember that the operational code does not deal with motivation or decision-style or interpersonal style but with beliefs. It does not dwell on political actors' needs for power, affiliation and achievement. The great advantage of this approach is that the operational code can be investigated without reference to motivation. These beliefs, implicitly or explicitly held by the political actor, can be inferred or postulated by the investigator on the basis of the kinds of data, observational opportunities, and methods generally available to political scientists and historians. The operational code is basically qualitative content analysis (Walker 1983, 180; Hermann 1980, 8–9).

A traditional realist would answer the philosophical questions as follows: Conflict is an inherent part of the human condition and is therefore permanent. The basic source of conflict is human nature; conflict is built into man's nature. All nations will pursue selfish interests, irrespective of their national attributes, whether communist or democratic. Therefore, the best achievable condition of peace is to maintain an equilibrium among the major political actors in the international system via countervailing alliances. Furthermore, conflicts tend toward zero-sum and display strong linkages. The realist paradigm stands, however, in sharp contrast to Fulbright's operational code (Morgenthau 1967; Mearsheimer 2001).

Fulbright and the United Nations

In Fulbright's early period as a lawmaker (1943–1946), he would answer the question about the nature of the political universe with the belief that conflict is temporary, that it is possible to reconstruct the international system reflecting a latent harmony of interests. The basic source of conflict was the anarchical international system. A condition of peace would therefore be the transformation of the international system through the gradual transfer of sovereignty to the UN. The United States as the strongest nation had the duty to participate vigorously in the transformation of the anarchic system.

It appears that Fulbright was extremely dissatisfied with the rules of the game of international politics and the patterns of authority characterizing the nation-state system. For him, sovereignty was the original sin of international politics. What could be done about it? The answer depended largely on the estimates he made of his nation's adaptive capabilities. He stressed the necessity of the United States' full involvement in the process of progressively enabling the community of nations to control the security destiny of its members, coupled with a high estimate of the US' willingness and ability to bring about the transformation of the international system and the redemption of history from the scourge of power politics, raison d'etat and spheres of influence. His principal contribution was the Fulbright Resolution of April 5, 1943, putting the House of Representatives on record that it favored the establishment of and United States participation in a United Nations (Divine 1967; Tweraser 1971, 70; Woods 1995, 79–84). A rabid right-wing paper editorialized "that the measure was introduced by a first-termer from Arkansas, who in his formative years was sent as a Rhodes Scholar to Oxford to learn to betray his country and deprive it of its independence" (Chicago Tribune, September 22, 1943, quoted in Johnson/Gwertzman 1968, 73).

Now, Fulbright as a freshman junior legislator was at a great distance from the points of leverage because of his low status. But his early successes – the Fulbright Resolution and victory in his bid for the Senate in 1944 – propelled him from relative obscurity to national attention and infused him with the type of confidence necessary for further success. In shepherding the

Fulbright Resolution through the Congressional obstacle course, he turned out to be a shrewd tactician, methodically taking a step at a time, careful not to antagonize persons with power of obstruction and accepting the necessity of compromise.

The idea of educational exchange was not yet at the center of Fulbright's thinking. On the contrary, he was in strong disagreement with those who assumed that the only solution to the problem of war was the development of humility and tolerance in the individual. Putting his hope in the transformation of international politics rather than in a change of national psychology, he chided those who would place hope only in man's discarding of his selfishness and vanity. "That is practically defeatism, fatalism that man has no control over his future. […] Certainly that is not the American way of doing things" (Fulbright 1943, A414). It is against the grain of American exceptionalism, as he might have phrased it.

Fulbright, the Reluctant Cold Warrior

As a Senator, Fulbright continued to espouse his community-oriented internationalism, but by the spring of 1946 had to disabuse himself of unrealistic assumptions about the possibility of tackling directly the most fundamental institutional fact in world affairs – state sovereignty. He was especially disappointed with the failure to reach agreement about the control of atomic weapons. His changing estimates of Soviet intentions induced him to reluctantly identify with the official position of the United States government that preservation of the existing system rather than its transformation was the task of the hour in the face of Soviet attempts to extend communist influence and control. Communist expansion must be countered by a network of regional organizations to make up for the weakness of the global organization.

The principal lessons he learned seemed to have been to side-step the UN and build a community of like-minded states in order to make the world safe for the United States. With the fear of a revived isolationism ever present, he vigorously supported integrative anti-communist policies, especially in Western Europe, such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and NATO. He swam, however unhappily, in the mainstream of liberal internationalist thought characteristic of the postwar generation of American policymakers whose theories came to ominous fruition in Vietnam (Offner 2002; Hogan 1987; Tweraser 1971, 147–150, 218–242).

Fulbright still believed that conflict was only a temporary phenomenon. Were it not for warlike states, peace would prevail. He now considered warlike states rather than the anarchic system as the basic source of conflict. The condition of peace would be attained by the containment and the eventual reform of warlike nations. The nature of the conflict was zero-sum and issues tended to be closely linked. He readily accepted the theory that if one state in a region came under the influence of communism, surrounding countries would necessarily follow in a domino effect (Gaddis 1982).

Thus, by May 1946, he had reached the conclusion that attempts at global institutional conversion had to be postponed for a more propitious moment in history or restricted to an area where shared values offered a better chance for success, such as Western Europe. The mission of the United States was no longer, in Fulbright's view, advocacy of global institutional schemes but leadership of the free world. His major theme was the containment of the Soviet Union. At roughly the same time, international education began to replace his attempts to bring about global institutional reform. Perhaps if common value patterns could be established in the world by spreading awareness of human unity and extending the faculty of empathy, would it not be possible to

sneak up on the nation-state system, gradually undermine it and control violence through interna-tional education? After all, the basic sources of conflict were not just warlike actors but also man's nature, his lack of knowledge, understanding, empathy and adequate communication. Conse-quently, the conditions of peace will be brought about through better knowledge and education.

The Genesis of the Fulbright Exchange Program

Fulbright's belief in the longterm efficacy of international education found legislative expression in the Fulbright Act of August 1, 1946 (Johnson/Colligan 1965, 13–14; Johnson/Gwertzman 1968, 107–112; Vogel 1987, 12–13; Woods 1987, 22–26; Jeffrey 1987, 41–46; Arndt 2006, 166). For him, it now seemed obvious that there was an essential linkage between education, travel, the exchange of ideas, and the creation of a world community. He himself had benefited from an internationalist strong mother, the Rhodes Scholarship program, and from a grand tour of Europe. His mentors in Europe were his tutor at Pembroke College, R. B. McCallum, and a savvy Euro-pean journalist, Mike Fodor. McCallum was an ardent Wilsonian Liberal (McCallum 1944). Fulbright, in his own words, left Oxford with a "wide-eyed internationalist outlook" (Brower 1966, 92). Fodor introduced him to the intricacies of Central and Southern European politics. Fulbright had come to national attention as a young educator. He was eager to use his institu-tional position to strike a blow for international education. Fulbright was not alone in his en-deavor to humanize international politics. Others, too, were receptive to the "minds-of-men" theory of international politics, stressing the distinction between genuine human needs and raison d'etat. "Peace through understanding" struck a receptive chord in men of good will. What dis-tinguished Fulbright from others was his going beyond general declarations about the desirabil-ity of international cultural relations and actually assuring a unique way of financing cultural exchange by linking it with the disposal of American surplus property overseas, converting "leftovers of war into instruments of peace" (Johnson/Colligan 1965, 3).

Fulbright had to overcome the xenophobia of a good many of his colleagues. A prime ex-ample was the attitude of Senator McKellar of Tennessee, who regarded the idea of cultural exchange as dangerous. It "would take our young boys and girls over there and expose them to these foreignisms" (Woods 1995, 131). Fulbright also had to be careful to avoid arousing the ire of the fiscal conservatives who did not want the Treasury to be burdened with new expenditures (Woods 1995, 130–135). His idea of using the proceeds accruing from the sale of surplus prop-erty against soft currency was a felicitous marriage of virtue with thrift. Also, American business interests succeeded in 1944 in having Congress pass a measure prohibiting the repatriation of surplus property since they did not want these government stockpiles dumped on post-war mar-kets. However, under the Lend-Lease Act recipients were required to pay for the items not used in dollars. Since war-devastated recipient countries had no dollars, they could only pay in their own soft currencies or incur debts to the United States. Enlightened American internationalists did not want new war debt issues to plague international politics as they had in the aftermath of the First World War. Fulbright's suggestion to use part of the credits generated by the sale of surplus material against soft currencies for educational exchange was an ingenious way to avoid the war debt issue. The Senator's sophisticated way of integrating international education into American foreign policy was backed by solid precedents. Fulbright especially invoked the prec-edent set by the American remission of the Boxer indemnities in 1908 which financed a fruitful program of cultural exchange between the United States and China.

Fulbright had to overcome lukewarm support from the White House and the Bureau of the Budget which considered the Fulbright Bill unconstitutional because it bypassed the Treasury. Funds could not be earmarked for education without a specific appropriation. Since the Bill was a foreign policy initiative by Congress, the State Department feared encroachment of its turf. Foreign policy initiatives had to originate with the State Department. Some officials there also feared that the Comintern could use the Fulbright Program to infiltrate its agents into the United States. Fulbright was able to convince high State Department officials that spreading knowledge about American culture was a most effective way to combat communism. In a superb display of his pragmatism, Fulbright overcame executive branch reservations. The Secretary of State was empowered by Congress to sign agreements financing educational activities for Americans in foreign countries and to pay for transportation of visitors from abroad to study in the United States.

In Congress, Fulbright secured the support of Ex-President Herbert Hoover, who was instrumental in establishing the Belgian-American Educational Foundation after the First World War, using funds left over from the relief program. On August 1, 1946, President Truman signed PL 584. Fulbright summed up the rationale behind the Exchange Program at that time: "It is my firm belief based on personal experience, that the interchange of students between countries can play a major role in helping to break down mutual misunderstanding and in furthering the kind of knowledge that leads to mutual confidence" (Fulbright 1946, A4766).

Traditional realists were wont to point out the fallacy of assuming that the issues of international conflicts are due to misunderstandings. According to the venerable Hans Morgenthau, a brilliant German-born political scientist, "the correlation between understanding and the inevitability of conflict is one of the melancholy lessons history conveys to posterity: the more thoroughly one understands the other side's position, character and intentions, the more inevitable the conflict often appears to be" (Morgenthau 1967, 504). Thus, not only xenophobic nuts and fiscal conservatives doubted the efficacy of Fulbright's approach to international education.

The Exchange Program and the Cold War

The Fulbright Exchange Program now faced two critical problems: how to protect the program from political interference and short-term policy considerations, and second, how to finance the dollar expenses of foreign grantees in the United States and how to carry out academic exchanges in countries without surplus property sales. The first problem was solved or at least contained by establishing a ten-member presidentially appointed Board of Foreign Scholarships to select participants and to provide general supervision for the exchange program (Vogel 1987, 15). The second problem was seemingly overcome through the Smith-Mundt Act of 1947, known as the US Informational and Educational Exchange Act, empowering the State Department to seek appropriations to cover dollar expenditures of educational exchanges.

The financing of educational exchanges through government appropriations had, on occasion, quite unfortunate consequences. The exchange program inevitably became involved in the turf battles within the government bureaucracies. In the State Department, the battles were between those who favored hard-hitting propaganda through the "fast media", such as popular newspapers, radio and film programs over the supposedly "slow media" that dealt with education (Ninkovich 1981, 140–167; Wagnleitner 1994, 50–82, 156–158; Rosenberg 1982, 212–219; Cull 2008; Belmonte 2008).[4] When it came to distribution of revenue, preference inevitably was

given to cultural propaganda, designed to achieve immediate advantages over cultural exchanges designed for long-term effects.

The trend became especially pronounced with the heating up of the Cold War. By 1947, most internationalists had become integrated into the Cold War consensus. William Benton, a liberal Cold Warrior and public relations specialist, became Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, replacing Archibald McLeish, a Wilsonian universalist, Librarian of Congress and friend of Fulbright. McLeish was the author of the famous dictum anchored in the Constitution of UNESCO: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men the defense of peace must be constructed". Yet, during the Cold War, the temptation was ever-present to sell not only information but also educational exchanges as proper instruments to win the confrontation with communism and establish global power (Kramer 2009). On occasion, even Fulbright himself succumbed to the temptation in order to save the educational program from fierce competition with the information program for limited funds (Woods 1995, 194).

Whether or not a country could participate in the exchange program was a highly political decision beyond the purview of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. It was at this point that short-term political considerations triumphed, despite the opinions of the predominantly internationalist members of the Board that cultural contacts should be maintained regardless of political difficulties (Ninkovich 1981, 146). Fulbright's worry during the early Cold War years was whether he could secure the very existence of the exchange program in the face of a domestic right-wing onslaught culminating in Senator McCarthy's attacks on internationalism.

McCarthy's anti-intellectualism, bigotry, super-patriotism, fear of diversity and foreign cultures resonated in an astonishingly large segment of American society. The exchange program was considered by some the epitome of treason. Not surprisingly, a serious clash between Fulbright and McCarthy occurred in 1953 when the Senator from Wisconsin questioned the integrity of the exchange program. Fulbright successfully refuted McCarthy before the Senate Appropriations Committee, when the latter tried to question the patriotism of members of the Board of Foreign Scholarship in their application of security checks to exchange grantees (Johnson/Colligan 97–103; Woods 1995, 181–183). McCarthy personified for Fulbright the "swinish blight of anti-intellectualism" which he correctly considered a mortal danger to the educational exchange program. While McCarthyism and the politics of fear lost its public virulence, it continued to lurk beneath the surface of American politics, ready to burst forth at the next severe crisis (Hofstadter 1963; McGirr 2001).

The next great crisis that posed, in Fulbright's opinion, a threat to the exchange program and to American politics in general was the presidential candidacy of Senator Goldwater in 1964. President Kennedy's cautious attempts toward a detente with the Soviet Union – so felicitously captured in his phrase "to make the world safe for diversity" – encouraged Fulbright to reflect publicly on the inadequacies of past Cold War beliefs and to expose what appeared to him "old myths" unsuited to be any guidance in the presence of "new realities" of international politics (Fulbright 1964a, VI, 4–5).

As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he was now in a powerful position to make his voice heard in the corridors of power. In hearings and speeches, he dramatized the fact that the American-Soviet adversary relationship was of a limited nature and did not exclude cooperation and accommodation. He engaged in what he considered the Senate's proper role: to shape broad policies by trying to mold a broad national consensus. He wanted to enable the administration to go beyond vague statements that different communist countries should be treated differently and that economic and cultural bridges should be built across the Iron Curtain

in a process of peaceful engagement. The building of bridges to communist countries was absolutely repugnant to Goldwater. Much of what Fulbright said in his *Old Myths and New Realities* was intended to challenge the simplistic views of Goldwater and his supporters during the presidential campaign of 1964. The controversy was another round in Fulbright's attempt to shield foreign policy from a particularly pernicious domestic mood. He charged that there was a kind of romantic mysticism in the Goldwater view of the world. Goldwater seemed to believe that there is something unnatural and immoral about the survival in a world of more than one set of beliefs about the organization of human societies (Fulbright 1964b, 21675). What Fulbright first and foremost objected to was Goldwater's Manichean view of the Cold War. It was a struggle between total virtue and total evil, between godless people and the people of God. "Our job," said Goldwater, "… is to persuade the enemy that we would rather follow the world to Kingdom Come than to consign it to Hell and communism" (Goldwater 1963, 111–112).

Goldwater came up with such brilliant suggestions as withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, fomenting rebellion in communist countries, stopping East-West trade, dropping low-yield atomic bombs on Chinese supply lines to North Vietnam, withdrawal from the UN, and, to top it off, elimination of the cultural exchange program (Fulbright 1964c, 22032).

In 1964, the American electorate displayed wisdom, electing President Lyndon Johnson in a landslide. The Goldwaterites were political purists who were not so much interested in winning an election but in vindicating their principles. The party the purists wanted was not merely a conservative party, it was in effect no party at all but a distinct and separate community of co-believers resembling more a religious movement than a multi-interest organization (Wildavsky 1965, 399–400).

Fulbright's fear of Goldwaterism had a tragic consequence. He became a willing tool of President Johnson in guiding the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through the Senate in August 1964 (Fulbright 1966a, 51; Tweraser 1971, 533–567; Goldstein 2008, 125–129)[5]. Apparently, he worried that any serious questioning of the precise meaning of the Resolution would give aid and comfort to a Republican presidential candidate whose absurdly simplistic anti-communism and anti-government attitudes pointed toward a policy of extreme militancy should he be elected.

Fulbright the Dissenter

It was in the spring of 1965 that Fulbright's operational code underwent significant changes. While one detects hesitant probing of some liberal cold war assumptions prior to Vietnam, it was the intervention in the Dominican Republic in the spring of 1965, the Americanization of the war in Southeast Asia, and the domestic urban and racial crisis at home which forced Fulbright to begin a thorough re-examination and realignment of his views on American foreign policy. His response to the double crises abroad and at home culminated in the staunch assertion that the first duty of US policymakers was to work toward the perfection of American society itself, to make it more compatible with a future that holds the threat of increasing unrest and change in the international system that even the strongest nation cannot control. No longer were Fulbright's foreign policy efforts predominantly directed toward making the world safe for the United States but toward making the United States safe for the world.

As a consequence, Fulbright shifted his attention toward the domestic institution of foreign policy which he saw as largely responsible for US commitments in the world: the Presidency.

From a rather uncritical acceptance of the virtues of a strong Presidency in foreign policy, the Vietnam experience compelled Fulbright to work toward a diminution of Presidential power and to view the obstructive prerogatives of the legislature in a more positive light (Tweraser 1974, 58–60; 1971, 571–574). His reorientation had already begun, although rather hesitantly, in 1964. In *Old Myths and New Realities*, published that year, he did not yet touch the problems of Vietnam and China. He was as convinced as the administration of the implacable hostility of China and the necessity of opposing the expansion of Asian communism. Where communism represented the status quo, as in Europe, he advocated the building of bridges. So did the administration. Where communism insisted on changing the status quo, as in Asia, it had to be contained. Intervention was justified when a vital national interest was at stake. As to when and where that was, Fulbright still accepted the administration's definition of the situation. The re-orientation had not yet affected his conception of the necessary predominance of the executive in foreign affairs. Indeed, his prime worry was not inordinate power of the executive and the erosion of legislative power in foreign affairs but the interference of his legislative colleagues with what he considered the rational exercise of presidential supremacy.

The intervention in the Dominican Republic in April and the Americanization of the Vietnam War in July 1965 had a catalytic impact on Fulbright's operational code. In May 1965, his relationship with President Johnson was still cordial. He still trusted that the President would not escalate the war. Senator Fulbright was at that time on a speaking tour in Europe. In Vienna he delivered a melancholy disquisition on the theme that "there is no direct relationship between the happiness of individuals and the grandeur of nations, that chaos is the price men pay when they break the continuity of history, that the old order which collapsed in 1914 has not yet been replaced by a new one […] We are all […] children of revolution, born to conflict, bred in insecurity, and eternally groping toward some new certainty in our lives, toward a new order that will restore some measure of security and stability to the affairs of men and nations" (Fulbright 1965a, 1).

In September 1965, Fulbright realized that his private efforts to change the President's mind had come to naught. He left the "President's team" and joined the alliance that was in the process of being formed in opposition to the Vietnam War. His vehicle was a highly critical speech on the executive misjudgment by intervening in a civil war in the Dominican Republic. The speech transformed him – one who was by inclination a figure of the establishment – into a public challenger of the credibility of President Johnson (Fulbright 1965b, 23859).

From 1966 on, Fulbright used the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a public forum for the airing of informed and diverse opinions on both general and specific aspects of American foreign policy. The most damaging testimony for the Johnson administration came from the venerable George Kennan (Berman 1988; Small 1988). Apart from legitimizing dissent, Fulbright himself worked on a redefinition of international politics. He favored a definite shift of policy away from intervention abroad. No longer did he perceive the international system to be tightly interdependent with small causes throwing the system into major disequilibrium but rather as loosely connected, with the occasional rise of a communist regime having no more than local impact.

Fulbright began to re-emphasize the imperative of humanizing international relations through expanding the search for solutions to shared problems in such comparatively manageable areas as technological development, scientific techniques, educational methods and other functional enterprises. His search pointed ultimately toward an international system characterized by expanded arms reduction and control agreements, eventually doing away with the balance of

power and ushering in a partial pooling of sovereignties under expanded world law. In an emergent system of that kind, the United States role would be to provide leadership through example. Example of what? "That the nation performs its essential function not in its capacity as a *power*, but in its capacity as a *society* […] that the primary business of the nation is not itself but its people" (Fulbright 1966a, 256, emphasis in original).

It should be obvious that Fulbright's reappraisal was not welcome news to the Johnson administration. Generally speaking, whenever somebody was displeased with Fulbright, an instrument of revenge was readily available: attack on the Educational Exchange Program. A serious threat to the integrity of the program arose in 1966. Fulbright had received disturbing reports that the CIA had penetrated the program, using Fulbrighters abroad to gather information. He called in vain for a special investigation of the CIA's activities. The Senate turned down his request (Woods 1995, 430–432).

When in 1968 Fulbright and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected the administration's foreign aid bill and substituted a simple resolution extending aid at 80% of the previous year's level, the administration took revenge by starving the Exchange Program. The State Department budget for fiscal year 1969 provided for a 72% cut in the program. Although Fulbright managed to retrieve some of the funds, and the bi-national commissions in Britain, Germany and other countries took up part of the slack, it would be 25 years before the Fulbright Exchange Program regained the funding level it had enjoyed before the great Johnson cut (Woods 1995, 490).

Nixon's approach to the educational exchanges was determined by his traditional hard-nosed realism stressing power and control. Consequently, he viewed the participants in exchanges as agents and targets of US information policy (Woods 1995, 549). Fulbright apparently found more sympathy for the educational exchange program in Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who assured him that he felt strongly about the importance of intellectual relations among nations (Fulbright 1976, 4). In retirement Fulbright continued to champion the educational exchange program, launching campaigns in the press and testifying before Congress whenever unenlightened forces threatened to damage the program. In 1978, the Carter administration aroused the ire of Fulbright. President Carter had ordered the transfer of the Fulbright Program from the State Department to the US Information Agency.

Fulbright was furious because just after the educational exchange program seemed to have settled into an unobtrusive existence as part of the vast bureaucracy of the State Department, the transfer to a conspicuous, controversial, relatively small information agency was bound to draw unwelcome political attention to the program.

Clearly, during and after 1965 Fulbright's operational code underwent significant changes. He still believed that there was a latent harmony of interests, that therefore conflict was only temporary whereas realists continue to believe that conflict is endemic. At the philosophical level, Fulbright saw the basic source of conflict in human nature. While international education was always part of his operational code, after 1965 it assumed an even greater urgency. He now regarded the problems of the nascent international community primarily as psychological rather than institutional. Hence, the first objective of US foreign policy should be the shaping of attitudes to the realities of the nuclear age. "If there is any key to survival and security in the nuclear age," so the Senator, "it lies not in new and improved international peacekeeping organizations, nor in elaborate schemes for disarmament and disengagement, but in the personal attitudes of nations and their leaders, in their willingness to place the common requirements of humanity over conflicting aspirations of nations and ideologies" (Fulbright 1965c, 1).

Fulbright dismissed the primacy of foreign and military concerns as romantic nonsense. He wondered why "large nations seem to be driven by a sense of imperial destiny, as if it would be craven to forego adventure and to concentrate on the intelligent government of society" (Fulbright 1966b, 2). In the absence of an international community capable of making and enforcing civilized rules of international conduct, we must, so the Senator, through the creative power of education expand the boundaries of human wisdom, sympathy and perception. We must acquire a new dimension of self-understanding about human nature. As Fulbright put it, "With the help of psychology we must come to terms with ourselves, accepting our animal nature, but regulating it in such a way that we can meet the needs for survival" (Frank 1968, ix). Education and psychology, therefore, should not be at the periphery but at the center of international relations.

In these endeavors the United States ought to take the leadership, becoming in her own politics a shining example to the rest of the world. Invoking John Quincy Adams, Fulbright saw the new (old) role of the United States as being "the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all, but the champion and vindicator only of her own." (Fulbright 1966a, 258) He did not ask whether Adams' prudent advice was still valid in the 1960s, whether influence is primarily a matter of example, and whether the American example is relevant to the world.

Conclusion

Fulbright's pilgrimage had led him from an early emphasis on institutional reform of the international system to maintaining countervailing power to insure a manageable international order and from there to trust in a gradual functional and largely non-political approach epitomized by his educational exchange program.

Realists are prone to dismiss all too easily the hopes associated with education. Indeed, they point to the prevalence of violence in international affairs, of territorial quarrels, of stubborn assertion of national sovereignty as a guiding principle in international politics. To Fulbright, however, there were causes closer to human needs than the struggle for power and prestige. He hoped that education would make people realize that the simple human desire for life and peace was vastly preferable to the intoxicating abstractions of nation and ideology.

NOTES

1 The article is based on a paper delivered at a conference on International Education in Vienna in November 2010 to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Fulbright Exchange Program in Austria. The author has published a monograph on the Fulbright public affairs and foreign policy beliefs (Tweraser 1974), which, however, did not specifically deal with the Fulbright Exchange Program. It concentrated on the perennial struggle between President and Congress over foreign affairs prerogatives, a struggle in which Fulbright played a prominent role.

2 Biographical data on J. William Fulbright (1905–1995): 1939–1941 – President of the University of Arkansas; 1943–1944 – U.S. House of Representatives; 1945–1974 – U.S. Senate.

3 The George construct consists of five philosophical and five instrumental questions, answers to which will comprehend an actor's political beliefs.
The philosophical questions are:
(1) What is the "essential nature" of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?
(2) What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respect the one and/or the other?

(3) Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

(4) How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development?

(5) What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development? (George 1969, 201–216)

4   Ninkovich, Wagnleitner and Rosenberg have been pioneers in developing the vast field of public diplomacy/cultural diplomacy during the Cold War into which the Fulbright Exchange Program has to be embedded.

5   In early August 1964 a minor incident took place between US and North Vietnamese naval forces. President Johnson asked Congress for an enabling resolution to respond. Fulbright, with little skepticism, shepherded a loosely worded resolution through the Senate which was used by Johnson to justify ever-escalating military action in Southeast Asia.

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US-MILITÄRREGIERUNG OBERÖSTERREICH 1945–1950, Band 2
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